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ABSTRACT—While self-driving cars may seem like something that can
exist only in a futuristic movie, the technology is developing rapidly, and
many states already allow test runs of self-driving cars on state roads.
Many car companies have announced that they will make self-driving cars
available as early as 2020. However, several manufacturers of the selfdriving car technology predict that personal ownership of vehicles will be
replaced by a car-sharing system, where companies own the self-driving
cars and rent them to consumers who pay per use. With more widespread
introduction of this technology comes many questions about how to assess
liability for accidents involving self-driving cars, and how insurance should
be structured to pay for those accidents. This Note discusses the potential
parties who could be held liable: drivers, car-sharing companies, and
manufacturers. This Comment suggests the elimination of liability for any
accidents involving self-driving cars, and recommends the creation of a
National Insurance Fund to pay for all damages resulting from those
accidents.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-driving cars may seem like something straight out of a sci-fi
movie. But as death rates from car accidents remain high, more and more
car companies are developing self-driving cars in an attempt to increase
safety in driving. In 2011, 29,867 fatal motor vehicle crashes in the United
States resulted in 32,479 deaths. 1 Roughly 15 of every 100,000 licensed
drivers died in a car accident in 2011.2 Some form of human error causes
approximately 95% of all car accidents.3 In an effort to reduce accidents,
automobile companies are inventing new technologies that increasingly
automate driving. These technologies include collision-mitigating braking

1
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)
Encyclopedia, NCSA DATA RESOURCE WEBSITE, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx
[hereinafter FARS Encyclopedia] [http://perma.cc/33KF-QBDQ].
2
Id.
3
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 059,
NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 23–26 (2008)
[hereinafter NMVCCS Report], available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811059.PDF
[http://perma.cc/8N3H-5T64].

804

109:803 (2015)

Splitting the Bill

systems and lane-keeping systems, which temporarily take control away
from humans to rectify human errors and prevent accidents. 4
Some companies are beginning to create fully autonomous vehicles
(AVs). These cars are completely automated and rely very minimally on
humans for their operation. Google is at the forefront of creating AVs, but
many large car companies are also planning to incorporate AVs into their
fleets within the next decade.5 Google touts these AVs as having the
potential to almost entirely eliminate human error, reducing automobile
accidents by 90%. 6
Regardless of the extent to which automobile accidents will decline
overall as more AVs replace human-operated cars, the use of AVs will, at a
minimum, decrease the percentage of accidents caused by humans while
increasing the percentage of accidents caused by product defects and
malfunctions. In the current system, approximately 94% of accidents are
caused by human error and less than 6% are caused by product defects, 7
but, in a new system dominated by AVs, those numbers are likely to
reverse. 8
One prediction is that private car ownership will be replaced by
extensive car-sharing and carpooling in AVs due to the cost of private
ownership of AVs. 9 Car-sharing companies will own a fleet of AVs that
people can rent as they need and can pay for based on the amount of
usage—resembling Zipcar, only on a larger scale. 10 People would send in a

4
Julie Goodrich, Comment, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS.
L. REV. 265, 269–70 (2013).
5
Will Knight, Driverless Cars Are Further Away Than You Think, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 22,
2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520431/driverless-cars-are-further-away-thanyou-think/ [http://perma.cc/7RUW-ZJFL]; Damon Lavrinc, Nissan Promises to Deliver Autonomous
Car by 2020, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/08/nissan-autonomousdrive/ [http://perma.cc/E93D-NBBF].
6
Chunka Mui, Fasten Your Seatbelts: Google’s Driverless Car is Worth Trillions (Part 1),
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2013/01/22/fasten-yourseatbelts-googles-driverless-car-is-worth-trillions/ [http://perma.cc/W8P7-DR2U].
7
Percentages were calculated using data from NMVCCS Report, supra note 3, at 24–26. Table
9(a) lists accidents that were caused by human error, which totaled 5096. The twenty-four accidents
caused by “glare” from Table 9(c) were added to that total because glare only causes accidents by
impairing human vision—a problem that would be solved by driverless vehicles—giving us a total of
5120 accidents caused by humans. This number was divided by the total number of accidents in the
study, which was 5471, giving us 93.6% (rounded to 94% for simplicity) caused by human error and
leaving us with 6.4% (rounded to 6% for simplicity) caused by product defects and other factors.
8
See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous
Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2012).
9
Todd Wilms, Google Driverless Car: Why You Will Probably Never Own One, FORBES (Oct.
23, 2013, 12:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2013/10/23/google-driverless-car-why-you-willprobably-never-own-one/ [http://perma.cc/R4YA-CUWS].
10
Id.
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request with their location, their destination, and the time they need to
arrive at their destination.11 The company would coordinate large-scale
carpooling with others who have similar requests. This will further reduce
the number of drivers on the road, which in turn will reduce accidents.
The overall number of accidents should decline as more AVs enter the
roads. However, there will still be traffic accidents, and the current civil
liability and automobile insurance systems are not designed to deal with the
changes that AVs will present. 12 Much has been written about how to
change the liability and insurance systems to respond to accidents in
privately owned AVs. 13 This Note instead addresses how the legal system
and automobile insurance framework will need to change to address
accidents when car-sharing and carpooling in AVs owned by a third-party
company is the norm. This Note assumes that car-sharing will be
widespread, but, even small-scale car-sharing will create similar legal
issues. This Note also assumes near universal AV use and largely does not
address issues that will arise during the transition period from humanoperated cars to AVs.
Part I discusses the current causes of automobile accidents and how an
increase in AV use will change which causes predominate. Part I also
briefly describes the technology behind AVs. Part II outlines how
automobile accidents are currently addressed by civil lawsuits and
describes the current state of automobile insurance policies. It also
discusses how accidents in Zipcars and rental cars are currently managed.
Part III shows several possible ways that accidents in AVs could be
addressed and the drawbacks of each. These ways include the riders, the
company that owns the car, or the manufacturer of the car paying for
damages.
Part IV suggests a creative solution that evenly spreads the burden
among the various actors mentioned in Part III. It recommends setting up a
national fund run by the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration into which each actor pays a monthly tax. When accidents
occur, injured riders can file claims for medical expenses, and the car-

11

Id.
See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1327–28.
13
See, e.g., NIDHI KALRA ET AL., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FHWA/CA/TL-CA091664, LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES (2009), available at
http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/researchreports/reports/2009/prr-2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle
_final_report_2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/QS47-Q5M5]; Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit,
Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453 (2013);
Andrew P. Garza, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles,
46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2012); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1327–28; Goodrich, supra note
4.
12
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sharing companies can file claims for property damages. The system would
operate similarly to current governmental funds like Medicare and Social
Security, where the government organizes payments as needed and resolves
disputed claims through preestablished mechanisms. This Note concludes
by suggesting that the federal government begin to consider how to address
the changes that AVs will necessitate, so that these safer cars can enter the
market as soon as manufacturers are ready to sell them.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF CAR CRASHES AND THE ARRIVAL OF
NEW TECHNOLOGY
A. Current Statistics for Automobile Accidents

Automobile accidents are one of the leading causes of death in the
United States and are the leading cause of death for teenagers in the United
States. 14 Advances in safety have cut down on the number of accidents, as
well as the number of fatalities and injuries from these accidents. For
example, 37,526 fatal crashes happened in the United States in the year
2000, and 41,945 people died as a result of those crashes.15 Those numbers
dropped by more than 20% by the year 2011.16 However, even with these
reductions, very large numbers of accidents still occur each year, with
estimates around 10.8 million accidents in the United States in 2009. 17
The overwhelming majority of accidents result from human error. The
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducted
the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVCCS), which
looked at a sample of 5471 automobile crashes in a two-and-a-half-year
period between July 2005 and December 2007. 18 Of those 5471 crashes,
93% were caused by human error, and only 2% were caused by a product
defect. 19 In addition, in some instances roadway conditions caused a human
to err in driving and crash, which raises the number of human-caused
crashes even higher. 20

14

Teen Drivers Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers_factsheet.html [http://perma.cc/GB9Z7ZVE].
15
FARS Encyclopedia, supra note 1.
16
In 2011, there were 29,867 fatal crashes and 32,479 deaths. Id.
17
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 693 (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/trans.pdf [http://perma.cc/JD7E-MF2G].
18
NMVCCS Report, supra note 3, at 4.
19
5096 crashes were attributed to human error, 135 to roadway and atmospheric conditions,
130 to the vehicle itself, and 110 did not have an easily determinable cause. Id. at 25–26.
20
These conditions include glare or obstacles blocking a driver’s view. Id. at 26.
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The types of human error that cause automobile accidents vary. In the
NMVCCS crashes, 41% of accidents caused by human error resulted from
“recognition errors.” 21 “Decision errors” resulted in 34% of human-caused
crashes. 22 Another 10% of human-caused crashes resulted from
performance errors such as overcompensation and poor directional
control. 23 Finally, 7% of human-caused crashes resulted from
nonperformance errors, like falling asleep at the wheel or having a heart
attack. 24
For the 2% of crashes attributed to the vehicle, the NMVCCS did not
address how many were due in part or in full to poor maintenance, vehicle
misuse by the owner, or both. 25 Vehicle problems can come from either an
inherent product defect or from improper use or care by the owner, so some
of the vehicle defects can themselves be attributed to human error. Thus,
having humans operate automobiles is the leading cause for 93% of
accidents.
B. How Autonomous Vehicles Work
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) will take control of automobiles almost
entirely out of the hands of the human driver. A person will need to tell the
car’s system where to go, but after that, he can completely relinquish
control to the car. 26 The car will do everything that a human operator would
need to do to get from point A to point B.27
Sebastian Thrun, one of the lead developers of Google’s self-driving
car, predicted that replacing all current cars with AVs would reduce traffic
accidents by 90%. 28 Based on the NMVCCS’s estimate that crashes are
caused 93% of the time by human error, Thrun’s prediction does not seem
that outlandish. Many of the human causes of accidents that the NMVCCS
outlined will disappear when an AV is used. In particular, human
deficiencies in vision and reaction time are eliminated by the new
21
Recognition errors include things like inadequate surveillance—meaning not looking where a
driver is going—and internal distractions, such as cell phones. Id. at 24.
22
These include going too fast, misjudging distances between cars, making illegal maneuvers,
and aggressive driving. Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 24–25.
25
Id. at 25–26.
26
See Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011,
9:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/how-google-self-drivingcar-works [http://perma.cc/W73A-VESZ].
27
For a demonstration of all the tasks the AV can do, see Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve
Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE&noredirect=1
[http://perma.cc/Z5X7-QHK7].
28
Mui, supra note 6.
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technology. 29 The AVs use sensors, cameras, and a laser range finder, along
with compiled data to have a much more detailed and accurate picture of
their surroundings in real time than a person possibly could. 30
Additionally, AVs will share data with each other in real time, so the
cars will have better knowledge of dangerous situations than humans do.
For example, once one AV crosses over a patch of black ice and makes
note of it, all other AVs connected to the same data will become aware in
advance that a certain area of road is dangerous.31 This will allow AVs to
either avoid those areas or proceed much more cautiously than would a
person.
AV technology is expensive, so some have predicted that large-scale
car-sharing and carpooling in AVs will replace private ownership as a less
expensive travel option. 32 The system would be a combination of the carsharing aspects of Zipcar, 33 the car-on-demand nature of Uber, 34 and the
ride-sharing programs that currently exist in many large cities.35 A
company would own a fleet of AVs, people would register online to
become members (as with Zipcar or Uber), 36 and a car would arrive at the
time and place a user designates.37 Like Zipcar, it would be a pay-per-use
system and would likely be less expensive than ownership of AVs, which
thus far have been priced at several hundred thousand dollars. 38

29

For a full description of the sensors and other technology the AV uses, see Guizzo, supra

note 26.
30

Id.
See Sebastian Thrun, Leave the Driving to the Car, and Reap Benefits in Safety and Mobility,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D4.
32
See, e.g., Emily Badger, What Will Happen to Public Transit in a World Full of Autonomous
Cars?, ATLANTIC CITYLAB (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2014/01/whatwill-happen-public-transit-world-full-autonomous-cars/8131/ [http://perma.cc/R8X7-YPDJ]; Wilms,
supra note 9.
33
ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ [http://perma.cc/KL5U-MG2V] (detailing how Zipcar owns
cars that it leaves parked around a city for members to pay to use as needed).
34
UBER, https://www.uber.com/ [http://perma.cc/C83G-2JW4] (describing the Uber ondemand taxi service, which allows members to make a request using a smartphone app for a taxi that
arrives shortly thereafter at the designated location).
35
E.g., Seth Kugel, Calling Shotgun: Ride-Share Services, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at TR4;
Mark Berman, SideCar, a New Ride-Sharing Service, Arrives in D.C., WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2013/03/22/sidecar-a-new-ride-sharing-servicearrives-in-d-c/ [http://perma.cc/3ZW9-NVU9].
36
See Wilms, supra note 9.
37
See id.
38
See Ashley Hasley III, Driverless Cars: 15 Things You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Aug.
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/driverless-cars-15-things-youneed-to-know/2014/08/25/786c6fbc-d79b-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html [http://perma.cc/3EA3CP7P]; Wilms, supra note 9.
31
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Additionally, the car-sharing system would be coupled with
carpooling to reduce the overall number of cars needed. The car-sharing
company would coordinate carpooling by finding requests from people in
similar locations needing to go to similar destinations around the same
time. 39 The ride sharing that is currently coordinated by neighbors would be
computerized to find the most efficient carpooling options. 40 Google aspires
to decrease the number of cars on the road by as much as 90%, and this
aspiration could prove true if car-sharing coupled with carpooling becomes
the norm. 41 Such a dramatic decline in the number of cars on the road
would cause a significant decline in accidents.42
There will still be accidents even if AVs are the only cars on the road.
The technology can never be perfect and—as anyone with a computer
knows—technology can sometimes crash or malfunction. The legal system
will need to adapt to provide avenues for those injured in accidents to seek
relief from whoever is responsible, whether it is the driver, the
manufacturer, or someone else.
II. THE CURRENT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE SYSTEMS AS THEY
RELATE TO AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
Both the current legal framework for determining civil liability for
accidents and the insurance framework for paying for accidents evolved
over time to respond to the realities of car accidents—namely that one of
the human drivers in the accident is likely at fault. The current systems are
efficient because the party most likely at fault for the accident (a human
operator) is the one who is initially sued and who pays for insurance. 43 For
accidents involving cars not owned by the at-fault driver, the situation is
very similar because the person in control of preventing the accident is still
the driver, not the owner. 44 As will be discussed in Part III, if car-sharing of
AVs becomes the norm and the causes of automobile accidents shift away
from human error, holding liable the people sitting in the car is no longer
clearly the best option. Instead, car-sharing companies and manufacturers
should hold some liability.

39

This is how SideCar already organizes ride sharing. See Berman, supra note 35.
Id.
41
See Mui, supra note 6.
42
Though fatal accidents are more likely on emptier roads, more accidents occur overall in
areas with the highest population densities. Where Car Accidents Happen Most, ESURANCE,
http://www.esurance.com/claims-info/accident-info/where-accidents-happen-most
[http://perma.cc/
89L9-66MP].
43
See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18.
44
The Graves Amendment shields the owner from liability. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012).
40
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A. The Current Automobile Accident Liability System
After an accident occurs, there are several ways the parties involved
could allocate cost. The drivers could agree on both who is at fault and how
much that person should compensate the other for the damages without
litigation. The drivers determine fault and damages and either use their
insurance coverage to pay the costs or pay out of pocket. 45 Some states
have passed legislation barring people from commencing personal injury
suits where the damages are below a certain level.46 This “no-fault system”
requires that a threshold level of damages be met; otherwise neither party is
declared to be at fault, and each party is responsible for its own damages. 47
Because fault is not established in these cases, the parties usually rely on
their first-party insurance to cover their damages. 48
However, the majority of states do not have a no-fault system, 49 so
when there is a dispute, drivers can initiate legal proceedings to resolve it.
One driver alleges that the negligent actions of the other driver caused
damages. 50 This occurs because “[i]n the vast majority of crashes, we
ascribe blame to one or more drivers rather than to design features of the
car.” 51
To prove the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff needs to show a
breach of the duty of care and proximate causation between that breach and
the plaintiff’s damages. 52 In some cases, both drivers are at least somewhat
negligent. 53 After determining fault, the finder of fact also must decide the
amount of damages. 54 Personal injury cases are the most common cases that
arise from automobile accidents because, as shown above, human error is
overwhelmingly the primary cause of accidents, and therefore, who was
negligent and how much the party owes are the two main questions that
arise in a human-caused accident.

45

Cf. KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117 (2013); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5102, 5104 (Consol. 2013).
47
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
662 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2005); KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 18–19.
48
See ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 725.
49
Id. at 726.
50
See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 20.
51
Id.
52
4-12 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 12.01 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2014).
53
See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 9 (2010).
54
4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 12.72; see also Sanchez v. King, 932 S.W.2d
177, 180–82 (Tex. App. 1996) (discussing the doctor’s testimony and medical records the jury used to
assess damages).
46
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In car accidents that result from a car defect, the driver can either join
the manufacturer of the car as a party to the accident’s lawsuit, or sue the
manufacturer after the first personal injury suit to recover the money the
defendant paid to the plaintiff in damages. 55 In these cases, the driver
claiming a defect must prove two things: (1) that a defect existed that
caused the accident; 56 and (2) that the driver did not know about the defect
and that there was no improper care or use of the vehicle that led to the
defect. 57 Currently, successful product defect cases related to car accidents
are fairly rare in part because it is unlikely that a defect, rather than a
human, caused the accident.
When an accident involves a car that the driver does not own, the legal
system treats it largely the same. The driver, and not the rental or carsharing company, is still held liable for negligence. Congress passed the
Graves Amendment for the purpose of shielding rental car companies from
liability. 58 Owners are not liable unless they commit negligence or criminal
wrongdoing that causes the accident.59 The Graves Amendment also covers
car-sharing companies, such as Zipcar. 60 The Amendment recognizes that
the company that owns the car is not as able to avoid accidents as the
driver, and likely was not the cause of the accident, and thus should not be
held liable.
The current legal system logically aligns with the cause of most
accidents: human error. The expense of maintaining the suit rests on the
two drivers, one of whom is likely at fault and is going to be responsible in
the end for paying damages. Similarly, the burdens are correctly placed on
the drivers to show that their accident is one of the rare cases where a

55
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (describing
how plaintiff sued General Motors for the defect that led their gas tank to explode during an accident),
abrogated by Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998).
56
See, e.g., Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2002); Holloway v. Gen.
Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 250 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. 1977) (stating that without evidence
showing design defect or improper assembly, a directed verdict for the manufacturer should be
affirmed), rev’d on reh’g, 271 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1978).
57
See 4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 12.31; see also Jarvis, 283 F.3d at 40
(describing defendant’s evidence both of the driver’s failure to inspect the brakes and that there was no
defect); Holloway, 250 N.W.2d at 739–40.
58
49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012) (“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a
person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political
subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm
to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during
the period of the rental or lease . . . .”).
59
See Carton v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that owners of leased vehicles are only liable for negligent or criminal failure to maintain the car).
60
Moreau v. Josaphat, 975 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Minto v. Zipcar N.Y., Inc.,
No. 15401/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010).
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manufacturing defect exists, as opposed to forcing the manufacturer to
prove in every case that the accident is not one of the rare instances of
defect.
B. The Current Automobile Insurance System
Automobile insurance law and insurance policies also function in
ways that reflect the reality of car-accident causes. All states have
legislation requiring automobile insurance be purchased, and most states
require liability insurance as opposed to first-party insurance. 61 Almost all
insurance policies, however, include some amount of first-party insurance
coverage along with liability insurance coverage. There are multiple types
of first-party insurance: collision coverage for property damages, 62 MedPay
coverage for medical expenses,63 and Uninsured Motorist insurance. 64 The
liability insurance coverage pays for damages to someone else’s person or
property when the insured is at fault for an accident.
As mentioned above, some states have created no-fault systems for
automobile accidents. A no-fault system changes the normal tort liability
system in two ways: (1) by setting thresholds of seriousness for damages
that must be met before a person can bring a personal injury suit for an
accident; and (2) by using first-party personal injury protection (PIP)
insurance instead of liability insurance to cover the cost of damages in any
accident where a suit is barred. 65 In no-fault systems, the state requires each
driver to carry a certain amount of PIP insurance to cover their damages. 66
Some scholars have suggested that an entirely no-fault system where
all drivers have first-party insurance coverage and pay for their own
damages might adequately deal with the introduction of AVs to the road.67
It is important to understand the reasons that states have been reluctant to
institute a no-fault system to comprehend why no-fault may also not be
supported as a way to address AV accidents.
The main reason states have not adopted a no-fault system is because
it places strict liability on the victim for the accident. Many argue that

61
ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 662; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4009 (2014). But
see TEX. INS. CODE § 1952.152 (2013) (requiring motor vehicle insurance policies to provide first-party
personal injury protection unless the insured objects in writing).
62
ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 697.
63
MARSHALL S. SHAPO & RICHARD J. PELTZ, TORT AND INJURY LAW 842 (Carolina Academic
Press, 3d ed. 2006).
64
Id.
65
ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 725.
66
Id.
67
See KALRA ET AL., supra note 13, at 21.

813

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

placing strict liability on victims, as opposed to punishing the at-fault
driver, will incentivize drivers to be more reckless because they are not on
the hook for paying for damages caused by their actions. 68 This concern
does not carry over to a no-fault system for AVs because the passengers do
not “operate” the car and, therefore, cannot operate it recklessly. Another
argument against no-fault is that having strict liability for victims runs
counter to ideas of fairness and corrective justice: that the person who
caused an accident and damages should be held responsible so that the
victim can be made whole again, and the negligent actions can be deterred
in the future. 69 If no-fault systems were used to resolve accidents involving
AVs, this fairness concern would still exist.
One difference that a rented or shared car creates in accidents is who
holds the insurance. Rental companies and car-sharing companies carry
minimum levels of liability and first-party insurance for their cars so that
uninsured renters have some coverage. 70 This coverage, however, is often
insufficient to pay for all damages, so drivers have to cover the remaining
cost. 71 As the number of car-sharing companies and the use of shared AVs
increase, so too will the number of accidents that involve a car owned by
someone other than the passengers within. The system will have to adapt to
address this change.
The current requirement that car owners purchase mandatory liability
insurance is sensible because it insures that victims are compensated and
drivers are not bankrupted by accidents. However, if AVs reduce accidents
to a minimum and if liability for those accidents shifts away from drivers to
other parties, new forms of car insurance will be needed. Part IV discusses
a National Car Insurance Fund as one way to share the cost of damages
among all involved parties.
III. THREE POSSIBLE WAYS TO ALLOCATE BLAME AND EXPENSES FOR
ACCIDENTS AND THEIR DRAWBACKS
The current literature on AV accidents focuses on two general
categories of people who could be held liable for accidents involving AVs:
owner–operators and manufacturers. 72 In deciding who should be liable
where there is widespread car-sharing instead of private ownership, the
options change slightly. Whereas with private ownership, the owner and

68
69
70
71
72
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ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 726; SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 855.
ABRAHAM, supra note 47, at 726; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 21 n.4.
Ron Lieber, Consider Worst Case with Zipcar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at B1.
Id.
Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–29; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280.
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the operator are the same, with car-sharing, the owner is the company who
rents out the car, and the operators are all of the riders in a car at the time of
the accident. This creates three main sources for assigning liability: riders,
car-sharing companies, and manufacturers.
A. Drivers–Riders
As discussed above, currently liability rests predominantly on drivers
because one or both drivers in an accident are most likely at fault for it.
One option for AVs is to keep this status quo and continue to hold drivers
responsible for damages. Who exactly is the “driver” or “operator” is the
first problem posed by continuing the status quo.73 One option is that the
person in the driver’s seat should be the operator because she is in the best
position to use any kind of manual override for the autonomous driving
software. 74 However, the person in the driver’s seat may not be aware when
a malfunction occurs and thus may not be able to prevent the accident.75 In
a carpooling situation, holding the person in the driver’s seat liable makes
liability more about the luck of the draw (who happens to sit there that day)
than about fault.
Another option, then, is to hold all riders in the car equally liable. This
eliminates the issue of unluckiness, and it recognizes the reality that no one
in the car is truly “operating” it. 76 Each rider has the same amount of
control over whether the car malfunctions (i.e., no control at all) and so a
distinction between passengers and drivers is unwarranted, and all riders
should be considered operators equally. 77
There are several reasons to hold all riders responsible. First, there is
an assumption of risk argument for placing liability on the riders. 78 The
riders understand that there is a risk of the technology malfunctioning and
causing an accident, but they decide to take on that risk because the benefit

73
Several state legislatures have offered different solutions to the problem of whether
passengers in a car that is “operating” itself can still be called and considered “operators.” Goodrich,
supra note 4, at 288, 290–91.
74
See id. at 287–88, 290–91.
75
Currently, when there is a product defect that leads to an accident, the driver is not
responsible even though the driver has more control over the car than an AV user. See KALRA ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 27–31. It would not make sense to change this rule to hold a driver responsible for not
stopping an accident that comes from a product defect of an AV if the driver is not currently responsible
for that type of accident.
76
See Goodrich, supra note 4, at 288 (suggesting legislators create a distinction between
operating an AV—punching in directions but then letting it drive on its own—and operating it in a
meaningful way—taking over control manually).
77
See id.
78
Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1336.
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of using the car outweighs the risk. 79 Because the riders consented to the
risk of accident to get the benefits of AVs, under assumption of risk, they
would be barred from recovering from someone else, and instead would
have to pay for damages. 80
Another argument for placing liability on the riders is that it is easier
for the few people riding in the car to resolve the issues from an accident
than it is to coordinate with manufacturers. Those involved in the accident
are more likely to be local if they are users of a particular local car-sharing
company, whereas a manufacturer is less likely to have a local headquarters
that deals with products liability claims. 81 It would be more time efficient to
resolve the problem at the individual level without involving larger
companies because the individuals are more likely to live close to each
other, be able to meet face-to-face, and not have to navigate through the
corporate structure to find the appropriate person to speak with.
There are several ways that liability could be assessed to riders. First,
the riders in the car that caused the accident could be held jointly and
severally liable for all of the damages that result from the accident. This
includes bodily injuries to the riders in both cars and property damages to
both cars. Alternatively, the riders in the at-fault car could pay for
everything except the medical bills of the passengers in the other car, which
could be paid for by first-party insurance. There are many ways that
damages could be split while still holding the riders in the at-fault car the
most liable.
Second, all AV users could carry first-party insurance. When an
accident occurred, it would not matter which car was at-fault. Instead, each
rider would pay for his or her own medical expenses using first-party
insurance. Additionally, the riders in each car would be jointly and
severally liable for the property damages to the car they rode in and would
have to pay those damages to the company who owns the car.
There are drawbacks that apply to all of these methods of assessing
liability on riders. It essentially creates a no-fault or strict liability system
because the riders are not in a position to avoid the product malfunction. As

79

2-10 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, § 10.02(b)(ii) (“By voluntarily entering into a
situation where there are well-known, incidental risks, the plaintiff consents to look out for himself or
herself and relieves the defendant of any duty.”).
80
Id.
81
The primary legal departments that would address products suits tend to be located at
company headquarters and not all over the country. See, e.g., People: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
MARTINDALE, http://www.martindale.com/Profile/ProfilePeopleIndex.aspx?orgId=233667 [http://
perma.cc/7U5J-HS78] (showing that Toyota’s main legal department is located in Torrance,
California).
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mentioned in Part II, no-fault systems have not been widely adopted.82 The
public strongly dislikes punishing those who are not at fault and who did
not engage in any negative behavior that needs to be deterred.83
Additionally, riders are not in a position to make driving safer in the way
they are when they are actually operating and controlling the vehicle. In
contrast, manufacturers are in the best position to make the cars safer,84 but
they will have no incentive to actually do so if they are never liable for the
accidents caused by their unsafe products. Because riders cannot make the
product safer and prevent similar accidents from recurring, there is little
rationale in current personal injury law to create a no-fault system.
Along the same lines, holding riders liable sets up the wrong
incentives. Society should want people to use AVs because they are safer
vehicles and result in fewer accidents.85 If potential riders know they will
be liable regardless of fault on their part, they may choose not to participate
in the car-sharing system at all because of views that strict liability is
unfair. 86 For AV use to become widespread, the legal system needs to be
structured in a way that encourages individuals to try AVs in the first place.
If individuals are concerned about the cost to them of an accident because
they are held strictly liable for all damages, then demand will be
insufficient to encourage manufacturers to make the cars and car-sharing
companies to lease them. 87
Placing the cost of damages on riders also raises the problem that
riders generally have less money than the manufacturers. On the one hand,
this may not seem like a problem because drivers are currently held liable.
However, in the current system, drivers are also at fault for the accidents
and better able to prevent them, so these reasons justify having them pay
even if it frequently results in skyrocketing insurance premiums or
financial hardship for defendants. 88 In the new system, though, where
82

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 3.
Id. at 33 (stating that no-fault is met with skepticism because one of the main purposes of tort
law is corrective justice).
84
See infra Part III.C.
85
Dana M. Mele, The Quasi-Autonomous Car as an Assistive Device for Blind Drivers:
Overcoming Liability and Regulatory Barriers, 28 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 27 (2013).
86
There is evidence in other legal areas that participation is linked to perception of fairness. See
Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of Fairness in the U.S.
Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 764 (2005) (stating that citizens are more likely to follow the
law when they view legal authorities and legislative decisions as fair).
87
One could argue that shifting some of the cost to car-sharing companies and manufacturers
will disincentivize them as well. See infra Part IV.B for discussion of this potential problem.
88
In fact, in the current system, many people view plaintiffs’ products liability suits as an
attempt to go after deeper pockets instead of the party truly at fault. Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8,
at 1329.
83

817

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

drivers are not at fault, there is no negative behavior by riders that justifies
punishment. For those who believe that the manufacturer is either at fault
for malfunctions or in a better position to prevent malfunctions, it is more
sensible to have manufacturers pay damages both because they are more
blameworthy and because they likely have more capital.89 In general, the
articles discussing who should be liable in AV accidents regard blaming
“drivers” as the worst option because of the drawbacks pointed out above. 90
B. The Car-Sharing Companies
Unlike a scenario of widespread private AV ownership, the carsharing scenario separates the owner of the car from the “operator” of the
car. These owners are another potential actor on whom liability could fall
when an accident occurs. As with drivers, there are several different ways
that these companies could pay the costs of an accident. They could be held
liable for all damages that occur anytime one of their cars malfunctions and
is at fault. Other variations could have the company pay for only part of the
damages. For example, each company could be responsible only for the
damage to their car and the people within it. This would be like a no-fault
system where the company holds first-party insurance for all of its cars and
riders. 91 Similar to drivers, there are many ways that costs could be
allocated, at varying levels of cost to the company.
There are a number of reasons to hold car-sharing companies liable.
First, they are in a somewhat better position than drivers to improve the
safety of AVs because they can put pressure on manufacturers by their carbuying decisions. If they need to buy the safest cars because they fear
liability, they will encourage competition among manufacturers to improve
the safety of the cars they make for companies. 92
Second, the companies will reap a substantial benefit from putting
AVs on the road, but in doing so the companies create the risk that the cars
may malfunction and cause an accident.93 Because the companies are
89
Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247, 252.
90
See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 4, at 281; see also Marchant & Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–
29.
91
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 9–11.
92
Car companies already tout safety ratings to woo customers. See, e.g., Advancing the Future
of Safety, TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/letsgoplaces/safety-innovations/ [http://perma.cc/WNC6V82A]; see also Jerry Hirsch, Upstart Tesla Wins Top U.S. Safety Rating; What Will Competitors Do?,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/20/autos/la-fi-hy-tesla-nhtsa-safetyrating-20130820 [http://perma.cc/7SQL-TNKG]. The only difference, then, will be that car-sharing
companies, instead of individuals, will be the buyers that manufacturers must woo.
93
How Auto Insurance Companies Calculate Risk, DMV.ORG, http://www.dmv.org/
insurance/how-auto-insurance-companies-calculate-risk.php#How-Do-Auto-Insurance-Companies-
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willing to take this risk in the name of making a profit, they should also pay
the costs when the harm from this risk occurs. This is seen in other areas
where a company profits from unsafe activities.94 Holding a company liable
for its product is not unfamiliar to consumers, so holding the car-sharing
company liable likely would be seen as more just than blaming drivers.95
Additionally, in other areas of personal injury law, ownership of an
unsafe instrumentality can be sufficient to find liability when that
instrumentality causes harm. 96 When an instrumentality harms others, the
owner is punishable based on his or her status as owner, and it is
unnecessary to find any particular actions by him that caused the harm. 97 It
is well within current tort jurisprudence to place liability on the companies
based solely on their status as owner.
That being said, car-sharing companies are most similar to car-rental
companies, and the law currently shields car-rental companies from
liability. 98 There is clear legislative intent, expressed through the Graves
Amendment, to protect car-rental companies from liability, and holding
car-sharing companies liable for all accidents involving their cars runs
directly counter to that intent. 99
However, there is a question of whether the Graves Amendment’s
reasoning still applies when the cars are no longer human-operated. The
legislative history shows that Congress intended to shield rental companies
from liability because the negligence of the driver of the car, and not any
action of the rental company, caused accidents and injuries.100 Therefore, if
the driver is no longer negligent (because she is in an AV), that rationale
for shielding companies loses much of its strength.
Another drawback to holding the companies liable is it may make the
business of car-sharing cost prohibitive. The cost of maintaining high levels
Calculate-Risk [http://perma.cc/JPV6-9HWQ] (stating that companies consider people who drive more
a higher risk).
94
See, e.g., Chavez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (holding
railroad company strictly liable because it participated in transporting dangerous explosives as part of
its business); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) (listing factors for determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous).
95
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520.
96
See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 13, at 467–71 (discussing strict liability on canine owners
for harm (such as dog bites) done by the owned animal, and how this policy could be extended to AV
owners).
97
Id.
98
49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012).
99
Several courts have applied the shield to Zipcar, so the intent to protect extends to carsharing companies. See Moreau v. Josaphat, 975 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Minto v. Zipcar
N.Y., Inc., No. 15401/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010).
100
See Carton v. GMAC, 611 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that Congress had “clear
intent to forestall suits” against rental companies who did not cause the accident).
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of insurance to cover every accident from a malfunction of one of their cars
may be too high to make the business worth pursuing. 101 For car-sharing to
occur large-scale, many new car-sharing companies will need to arise. 102
High insurance costs may prevent new companies from forming, which
will, in turn, prevent widespread AV use. 103
C. Manufacturers
Placing liability on the manufacturers of the new AV technology has
received the most support in the debate over liability. 104 The biggest reason
that manufacturers are targeted for liability is they are in the best position
to improve the technology and decrease future malfunctions.105 Of all the
involved actors, the manufacturers are the most likely to be at fault for AV
accidents. 106 If society desires to continue a fault-based system of liability
for car accidents, blaming manufacturers would fit best.
An additional benefit to manufacturer liability is that the preexisting
legal framework of products liability is already prepared to address the
issues presented. Unlike personal injury law, which would have to adapt its
definition of “operator” to fit with a car that operates itself, products
liability law already addresses accidents that result from car defects.107
Resolving disputes over a car’s defects would be more within the current
competency of judges. Furthermore, society already accepts that car
manufacturers can be held strictly liable for defects in their products.108
Thus, even in cases where the AV manufacturer is not negligent, there

101
This argument is most often made in relation to the danger that manufacturers will not
create the technology because of fear of liability costs, but the same fears would be created in carsharing companies if they were held solely liable. See Mele, supra note 85, at 42.
102
Currently, Zipcar is the most popular car-sharing company, yet it only has cars in twentyfive major cities. ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/ [http://perma.cc/ZG4H-UB5J].
103
Keeping insurance costs low would have a similar effect as limiting recovery under
worker’s compensation schemes. Both reduce the cost for businesses of participating in areas where
they expose themselves to liability. For a description of how this works in worker’s compensation, see
William R. Kraus, How “Exclusive” is “Exclusive”? The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act and
Compensatory Damages in Discrimination Cases, 43 A.F. L. REV. 145, 150 (1997).
104
See, e.g., KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 20; Gurney, supra note 89, at 271; Marchant &
Lindor, supra note 8, at 1326–29; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280–81.
105
Mele, supra note 85, at 42 (“[D]evelopers of software and computer systems, if exposed to
greater liability, will have a greater incentive to create safer products, and are in the best position to
prevent harmful security breaches in the first place.”).
106
See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 20–21.
107
See supra Part II for a discussion of products liability. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); Goodrich, supra note 4, at 280.
108
See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 26; Garza, supra note 13, at 600.
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would be less aversion to applying strict liability on manufacturers than on
riders or car-sharing companies. 109
As it was for drivers and the car-sharing companies, the first option
would be to make manufacturers pay for all damages. The costs could also
be shared in a variety of other ways. Each manufacturer could be
responsible for damages to the car it manufactured and the people in it,
regardless of which car in the accident actually malfunctioned. Or the
manufacturer of the at-fault car could pay for everything except medical
bills of its own passengers, which would be paid for by first-party
insurance. Many ways exist to split the cost while still holding the
manufacturer predominantly liable.
Holding the manufacturer liable has fewer drawbacks on the fairness
front because the manufacturer is in the best position to improve quality of
the product and is most at fault for a defect. 110 Additionally, manufacturers
continually improve the safety of their vehicles to avoid the high costs of
liability, and removing these costs runs the risk of disincentivizing safety
improvements. 111 These benefits make manufacturer liability a popular
option for AVs.
However, the biggest problem with blaming the manufacturer is that
companies may never make the technology if it appears too expensive.112
There are many costs associated with being the bearer of liability: the high
cost of insurance to cover the damages, the administrative costs of working
with the insurance company to process claims, and any litigation costs that
arise from disputing claims. 113 If a car manufacturer knows that it will incur
these costs if it creates AVs, it may decide that producing AVs is cost
prohibitive. 114 Incentivizing the creation and use of these safer vehicles

109
Compare ANDERSON et al., supra note 53, at 3 (lack of support for a no-fault system for
drivers in accidents), with KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 26 (support for strict liability for
manufacturers of cars in products defects cases).
110
Mele, supra note 85, at 42.
111
Id. See discussion infra Part IV describing how a National Car Insurance Fund will still
incentivize manufacturers to improve AV safety.
112
In other circumstances, liability has led manufacturers to choose not to create a product. For
example, fear of liability led some vaccine manufacturers to cease manufacturing vaccines. Congress
passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, creating a no-fault compensation system, to
encourage vaccine creation and entry into the market. Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 344 (2011).
113
See Cost of Auto Crashes & Statistics, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INS. INFO. ASS’N,
http://www.rmiia.org/auto/traffic_safety/Cost_of_crashes.asp [http://perma.cc/TM57-SGA6]; see also
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Costs of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD
HIGHLIGHTS, Jan. 2013, at 1.
114
Mele, supra note 85, at 42; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 281.
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should be a goal of whichever liability system is chosen, and placing too
heavy a burden on manufacturers will frustrate that goal. 115
IV. SHARING THE COSTS: A NEW NATIONAL INSURANCE FUND
Riders, car-sharing companies, and AV manufacturers will all benefit
from increased use of AVs, and because there is no clear reason to place all
liability on one versus the other, the best solution is to create a no-fault
system and have everyone split the costs of damages. Under this system,
legislation would bar all personal injury suits from accidents where all of
the cars involved are AVs, not just those accidents below a certain damages
threshold. Instead, those with damages would turn to a National Car
Insurance Fund (the Fund) for recovery.
A. Potential Ways to Set up an Insurance Fund
There are several ways that a large-scale insurance fund paid for by all
actors could be run. This Note suggests that the best solution is operation
by a federal agency. However, state-run and private insurance funds will
also be briefly discussed.
1. The Federally Run National Car Insurance Fund.—The Fund
would work similarly to how Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
contributions to Social Security and Medicare operate now. FICA
contributions are removed from employee paychecks each month and
placed into trust funds for both Medicare and Social Security. 116 Those who
qualify for Social Security or Medicare benefits can then apply to receive
payments from the funds. 117 Many employees will never use the money, but
it is there for everyone who needs it.118 A governmental agency is in charge
of both processing the claims for benefits and paying the appropriate
amount to claimants. For example, the Social Security Administration
(SSA) processes claims for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), 119
whereas Health and Human Services oversees Medicare. 120

115

See KALRA et al., supra note 13, at 22.
Dave Roos, How FICA Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://money.
howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/personal-income-taxes/fica.htm [http://perma.cc/QF7J-V7XD].
117
See, e.g., Disability Determination Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/
disability/determination.htm [http://perma.cc/5Z6M-EYXY].
118
See Roos, supra note 116.
119
Benefits for People with Disabilities, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability/
[http://perma.cc/6N8Q-TT5V].
120
HHS Programs and Services, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/programs/index.html
[http://perma.cc/6CF9-X3HL].
116

822

109:803 (2015)

Splitting the Bill

The Fund would operate in the same way. Riders, car-sharing
companies, and manufacturers would all contribute through taxes and in
proportion to how much they benefit from the use of AVs. The money
would be stored in a trust fund and overseen by a department created within
the NHTSA. Anyone who suffers damages from an AV accident would file
a claim with the NHTSA department, who would review the claim and dole
out payments.
Manufacturers would contribute based on how many AVs they
produce in a given year because the more cars they create and place on the
roads, the more likely one of them will be in an accident. 121 Similarly, carsharing companies would contribute based on the size of their fleet,
because those with bigger fleets will be more likely to request money from
the Fund to pay for property damages. 122 Finally, riders would pay based on
their frequency of use so that those most at risk of needing payouts will pay
the most in taxes. Private insurance companies currently calculate a
driver’s potential risk of accidents from a variety of factors in deciding the
cost of premiums. 123 The NHTSA could work with these private insurance
adjusters to decide what level of taxation would be appropriate based on
the risks each rider, company, or manufacturer pose.
Private insurance companies also raise premiums for drivers who are
more frequently in accidents because they cost the insurance companies
more money in paid-out claims. 124 The NHTSA could make the same
determinations. Initially, all manufacturers and car-sharing companies
would pay at the same rate per car. However, if a particular manufacturer’s
or company’s cars are involved in accidents more frequently than the
average rate, their tax rates would be increased.125 This would appropriately
incentivize manufacturers to increase their products’ safety, and car-sharing
companies to purchase the safest cars.126 It would also ensure that those
121
Cf. How Auto Insurance Companies Calculate Risk, supra note 93 (showing that insurance
rates are calculated based on risk of accident and premiums increase when the risk for accident is
higher, such as for vehicles driven in heavy traffic areas where accidents are more likely).
122
See id.
123
Id. (factors include age, sex, occupation, place of residence, etc.); How Your Car Insurance
Rate is Determined, ESURANCE, http://www.esurance.com/car-insurance-info/how-car-insurance-ratesare-calculated [http://perma.cc/5T99-R5LA].
124
How Your Car Insurance Rate is Determined, supra note 123 (“A good rule of thumb: the
cleaner your driving record, the lower your premium.”).
125
The rate could be raised for riders, too, based on how many times they need to file a claim.
However, because riders are in a worse position to increase the safety of the car they happen to ride in
than either car-sharing companies or manufacturers are, the argument to raise a rider’s tax level for
frequent involvement in accidents is weaker.
126
See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 407 (fear of paying damages acts to deter others from
similar future misconduct). This increase in payment would help address the concern, discussed in Part
III, that removing manufacturer liability would reduce incentives to steadily improve safety features.
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companies whose vehicles had the most accidents, and therefore used the
Fund most often, paid more into the Fund.
The NHTSA would create particular requirements for what must be
sent to them as part of filing a claim. This is similar to the SSA process for
SSDI applications, which requires the applicant to provide specific medical
records that prove disability. 127 For injured riders, the NHTSA would
require medical records showing the actual cost of treatment for injuries.
People injured in car accidents already have to compile this information for
either their insurance company or for litigation, so sending it to a
governmental agency would be no greater hassle than is currently
imposed. 128
The NHTSA would also set requirements for documentation needed
from companies to prove property damages. This is also information that
car owners usually must provide to their insurance company or in litigation,
so it is not a heavy burden for companies. Companies and passengers will
benefit because they will only have to coordinate with the governmental
agency instead of having to coordinate with all of the people who were
involved in an accident. Because only one insurance plan is involved (i.e.,
the Fund), resolution of accidents should be more efficient than if each
party has its own insurance company that must coordinate with all the other
parties.
The NHTSA will review the claims and pay damages based on the
information provided by claimants, as well as review adjusters’ tables
about how much certain injuries cost. 129 An appeals process would be in
place, where claimants can send additional information or have an
administrative hearing if they feel that the agency did not award the proper
amount. 130 Because no one is truly “at fault” for the accident, the agency
would follow the lead of no-fault systems and only award compensatory
damages rather than punitive damages. 131 In establishing the Fund,
Congress will need to determine which economic and noneconomic losses

127

See, e.g., Disability Determination Process, supra note 117.
See How GEICO Investigates a Claim, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/claims/
claimsprocess/claim-investigation/ [http://perma.cc/R2T7-UX2V]; see also 4-12 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 52, § 12.72.
129
See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1532
(2009) (“Settlement mill negotiators and the cadre of insurance adjusters with whom they bargain come
to a common understanding of certain injuries’ proper value.”).
130
The appeals process could be modeled off of the one that already exists for SSDI claims.
See Disability Determination Process, supra note 117.
131
The point of punitive damages is to punish the person at fault, and because no one is at fault
in AV accidents, punitive damages become unnecessary. See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 445.
128

824

109:803 (2015)

Splitting the Bill

the Fund will cover. 132 Covering noneconomic losses may increase support
for the Fund, but will also raise the overall cost and will retain some of the
arbitrariness inherent in awarding pain and suffering. For economic losses,
using adjusters’ tables and records from claimants will help eliminate
arbitrary and excessive compensatory damages that often occur with jury
trials. 133 This should result in more standardized damage awards and an
overall lowering of the cost of damages per accident. Which losses the
Fund covers is a policy decision Congress will have to make based on
weighing the benefits of standardization against the costs of eliminating
pain and suffering recovery.
2. Alternatives to a Federally Run Fund.—This section discusses two
alternatives to the federal government creating and managing the trust
fund: (1) a state-run fund and (2) private insurance. These alternatives
might be more palatable to those with concerns about increasing federal
involvement in an area that, as discussed above, has previously been
dominated by private insurance and state law.
The first alternative is for a state agency to create a state-run insurance
fund. One benefit would be that instead of one federal agency dealing with
all claims nationwide, each state would have a smaller number of claims
that they could potentially process more efficiently. Second, a state-run
fund would have the benefit of being a better fit for each state’s needs.134
Each state could raise and lower the taxes on their citizens based on how
many accidents actually occur. States could also experiment with the means
by which they process claims to find what works best for their
constituencies. 135 With a National Fund, some states will end up paying
more than their citizens need because the tax rate will be decided based on
national needs. 136

132
Some states, in establishing a no-fault system, prevent recovery of any noneconomic losses,
such as pain and suffering. Id. at 844. States vary with respect to which economic losses are covered.
Michigan, for example, allows for a high level of recovery and covers all medical expenses and lost
wages. PAUL HEATON, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AUTO INSURANCE REFORM IN MICHIGAN 1
(2010).
133
See SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 839–41.
134
This is the classic “laboratories of democracy” argument, which posits that states are better
able to meet the individualized needs of their constituencies and to try out creative solutions to
problems because they are smaller and more localized entities. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (originating the term).
135
See id.
136
This is already seen with other federal taxes where some states are subsidizing others. For
example, in 2005, Mississippi received $2.02 in federal spending for every dollar it paid in federal
taxes, whereas New Jersey received only $0.61 in federal spending. Federal Spending Received Per
Dollar of Taxes Paid by State, 2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/federal-spending-received-dollar-taxes-paid-state-2005 [http://perma.cc/G7ZT-6D6A].
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However, with insurance, the more people who pay into the plan, the
lower the premiums are for everyone. 137 If a similar insurance fund were
state-run, the taxes would be higher because there would be a smaller
number of participants and thus less loss spreading. 138 The higher the taxes,
the less likely people will choose to switch to AVs.
A second problem with state-run funds is the administrative burden on
manufacturers and states. With the National Fund, the manufacturer would
just have to determine its national taxable income from all AVs it sold and
pay one federal tax. In contrast, with state-run funds, the manufacturer
would have to determine its taxable income from AVs in each state where
it sold them and then pay taxes to all of those different states. This may not
seem like a large burden because nationwide corporations already pay taxes
in multiple states. 139 However, the benefit of only having to pay one tax,
instead of potentially fifty, cuts in favor of the National Fund.
Private insurance companies could also operate the funds instead of
government-run insurance. Each private company would have one fund
into which all of their customers pay at different rates and from which each
customer could withdraw as needed. When there is an accident, the private
insurance adjusters would look at the black box, review medical and
property damage records, and allocate funds accordingly in the same way
the federal agency would. One benefit of using private insurance is that
private insurance companies’ adjusters are already trained to review
claims. 140 An additional benefit of private companies is that they could set
the premiums based on the risk their customers actually posed. 141 As with
the states, the smaller plans would mean narrower tailoring.
A drawback to private insurance is that, as with the states, the smaller
plan will mean higher costs. Additionally, costs will likely be higher for
private plans because the companies are for-profit. One look at the current
health insurance system shows just how high premiums can climb when
for-profit companies dominate the insurance scene.142 In contrast, if the
137

This is seen in health insurance. See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the
United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2005)
(“[Insurance] functions by spreading risk across a wide range of individuals, some of whom need care
in any given year and some of whom do not.”).
138
The larger a plan, the lower the costs. Id. (“By offering insurance to a large number of
individuals, it can take advantage of the likelihood that many insured individuals will pay more in
health insurance premiums than they will require in health care costs.”).
139
See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608–10 (1951) (each state has the
authority to tax any corporation who conducts commerce within its boundaries).
140
See, e.g., How GEICO Investigates a Claim, supra note 128.
141
See How Your Car Insurance Rate is Determined, supra note 123.
142
See generally Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health-Care Premiums Climbing Faster Than Inflation,
Studies Say, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118951621359523764
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Fund is the only game in town and only needs to break even, the prices will
be lower.
B. Benefits of Federal Agency Involvement
As mentioned in Part III, one drawback that exists for holding drivers,
car-sharing companies, or manufacturers liable is the possibility that
liability would disincentivize AV use. To be a better option, the Fund must
incentivize all actors to create, buy, and use AVs. The Fund will
accomplish this by lowering overall accident costs below their current
levels and decreasing the potential costs for each individual actor if they
were held solely liable.
As mentioned above, for insurance, the bigger the plan, the less each
person in it has to pay. This occurs because people with a high risk of
needing to file a claim (drivers with a history of accidents) are combined in
the same plan with those who are unlikely to file a claim (safe drivers).143
The more people in the plan, therefore, the more the losses that one unsafe
driver incurs can be spread out and collected as low premiums. 144
At first glance, this system does not seem to work for insurance plans
involving AVs because there are no longer risky or safe drivers. However,
there are still differences that will lead to higher risk of higher losses for
certain people. For example, people living in high-population states will be
a greater risk because there will be more cars in the state overall, which
means more accidents in the state.145 Additionally, places with high
population density are likely to have more people in each shared car
because people are more likely to live near each other and be going to the
same place. 146 An accident where four people are in the AV and are injured
[http://perma.cc/Z3Q-8FRW] (“[T]he annual cost for family coverage through an employer plan is now
more than $12,000, well over what a minimum-wage worker earns in a year.”); Alina Selyukh, Health
Insurance Premiums Climb Faster in 2011, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/27/us-usa-health-poll-kaiser-idUSTRE78Q31820110927
[http://perma.cc/Y3V-Z3V6] (“[T]he cost of health insurance continues to climb for companies and
workers, with annual family premiums this year growing at a pace triple that of 2010 and outpacing
wage increases . . . .”).
143
Cf. Richard C. Ausness, Litigation and Compensation: Paying for the Health Costs of
Smoking: Loss Shifting and Loss Bearing, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 537, 560 (1998) (explaining how loss
spreading works, using smokers as an example).
144
See id.
145
This can be seen just by basic math. If 1% of AVs are in an accident per month, then a place
with 1000 AVs is going to have fewer accidents than one with 1 million AVs. See also Where Car
Accidents Happen Most, supra note 42.
146
Carpooling is already most popular in areas with high population density, in part because
there are enough people who live and work near each other to make the system efficient. See Nelson D.
Chan & Susan A. Shaheen, Ridesharing in North America: Past, Present, and Future, 32 TRANSP.
REVS. 93, 101 (2012) (stating that, for example, casual carpooling (slugging) is seen in Houston, San
Francisco, and the D.C. suburbs).
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will cost more than an accident with one person, so the accidents in areas
with high population density will cost more on average. By combining
riders, car-sharing companies, and manufacturers from small and large
states, the National Fund will be much larger than the private insurance
plans that currently exist and will spread the risks effectively. 147
Right now, car insurance costs vary widely, but one study showed the
average cost can range from as little as $80 per month to as much as $213
per month, depending on the state. 148 The National Insurance Fund would
reduce this monthly cost by having many more people paying into one
large fund. 149 Additionally, the Fund could eliminate deductibles and
instead pay the entirety of each claim for damages. 150 If this were done, any
individual in an accident would save several hundred dollars more by
participating in the Fund instead of private insurance.
The taxes paid would vary based on use of the system and therefore
differ from FICA, which uses a flat percentage for everyone’s paycheck.
However, looking at the amount of money FICA taxes raise per year can
show how high the taxes would need to be to cover the cost of accidents.
Currently, 7.65% of an employee’s monthly paycheck is taken out for
FICA taxes. 151 The projected revenue from FICA taxes in 2014 is roughly
$1.033 trillion. 152 Car accidents in 2010 cost around one trillion dollars.153
Thus, even if AVs did not reduce the number and cost of accidents at all,
the amount the Fund would need to raise would still be less than what is
raised by FICA taxes, so the tax rate would also be less once AV use
becomes widespread. With manufacturers and companies also paying a

147
The total number of licensed drivers needing insurance in the United States is 210 million,
but they are spread among multiple insurance companies, like GEICO, who has only about 13 million
policyholders. GEICO at a Glance, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/about/corporate/at-a-glance/
[http://perma.cc/4HTN-BX83]; Our Nation’s Highways: 2011, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm
[http://perma.cc/C8QKK9XL].
148
Brian Quinn, Average Cost of Insurance: Car, Home, Renters, and Pet (2015),
VALUEPENGUIN, http://www.valuepenguin.com/average-cost-of-insurance.
149
The calculations in the following paragraph demonstrate this further.
150
Most private car insurance companies have a deductible that the insured must pay out of
pocket for an accident. The amount can vary widely, so the amount saved by the Fund eliminating them
would also vary. See Aaron Crowe, Higher Deductibles Can Save, CARINSURANCE.COM (last updated
Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.carinsurance.com/Articles/raising-deductible-savings.aspx [http://perma.cc/
Q8EP-7NGJ] (comparing deductibles ranging from $250 to $2500).
151
Topic 751 - Social Security and Medicare Withholding Rates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
(last updated July 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html [http://perma.cc/3S3K-DDLG].
152
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 12
(2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_
Feb.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EF7-Z63V].
153
Cost of Auto Crashes & Statistics, supra note 113.
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good portion of the taxes, the amount the tax would need to raise from
individual drivers would drop even lower.
Car insurance is not the only cost associated with car accidents.
Litigation is expensive, so each legal dispute over fault in an accident costs
the parties substantially. 154 By banning litigation and using the Fund
exclusively, injured parties will avoid the exorbitant costs of litigation.155
Furthermore, avoiding litigation will avoid the costs associated with
punitive damages and excessive jury verdicts.156 Although they are not
frequently awarded, punitive damages act as punishment for the
defendant’s negligence in driving and do not represent any actual costs of
the plaintiff. 157 By paying only actual damages and by using set formulas to
determine future damages, the NHTSA will reduce the costs of accidents
and thereby reduce the needed amount in the Fund.
Finally, as mentioned above, the NHTSA would not be trying to make
a profit and would only need to raise enough money to pay the actual cost
of accidents. As more AVs enter the market, fewer accidents should occur,
and the NHTSA could lower taxes even further. Not needing to turn a
profit allows the NHTSA to set prices that accurately reflect the amount it
needs to pay claimants each month. 158
All of the lowered costs will be spread among the riders, car-sharing
companies, and manufacturers, so unlike the alternatives listed in Part III,
no one actor is getting punished more severely. Each actor should pay less
per accident than it currently does. By reducing the financial burden on all
actors, everyone is incentivized to create and use AVs.
C. Barriers to Creating the Fund
Many barriers exist to creating new, large-scale government programs.
This Note is not suggesting that the Fund is the most likely or even a very
feasible option, but instead is suggesting that if implemented, the Fund
154
See Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 113 (stating that at the median, a senior
attorney’s billable hours alone cost $20,763 for a full automobile tort trial, and that adding an expert
makes the total fees per case $43,238); William A. Taylor, The Economics of a Civil Lawsuit, BUS.
LAW. (Feb. 19, 2015), available at http://www.thebusinesslawyers.com/BBL_News_Articles/
Litigation%20Economics%20101.pdf [http://perma.cc/manage/vest/F6SZ-48YV] (stating that civil suits
can easily cost up to $50,000).
155
Barring suits to meet the purpose of avoiding litigation costs and larger awards is currently
best seen in the Worker’s Compensation context. See Kraus, supra note 103, at 150.
156
SHAPO & PELTZ, supra note 63, at 447 (stating that the Supreme Court has upheld jury
awards for punitive damages that are “more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses”).
157
Id. at 445 (discussing the punishment and deterrence rationales for punitive damages).
158
For example, Congress has changed FICA tax levels twenty-one times since 1935. Program
Provisions and SSA Administrative Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
statcomps/supplement/2010/2a1-2a7.html#table2.a3 [http://perma.cc/9Q5S-6422].
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could solve some of the problems that arise from holding only one party
liable for AV accidents. This Section touches on some of the biggest
hurdles the Fund would face and recognizes that some of those hurdles may
be insurmountable.
As anyone who has read the news about the Affordable Care Act
knows, many members of the public do not like government involvement
in areas that they see as better suited for private business.159 The same
concerns about excessive federal government involvement will likely meet
any proposal for replacement of private car insurance with a national
version. However, not all large government programs are as disliked as the
Affordable Care Act. For example, support for Social Security and
Medicare was fairly high in recent public polling. 160 Additionally, despite
frequent public criticism, Congress did pass the Affordable Care Act, and it
has remained on the books since 2010.161 Therefore, negative public
opinion is not always an insurmountable hurdle to Congress dramatically
increasing a governmental program, and the Fund could gain enough
support to pass in Congress.
Lobbying against the National Car Insurance Fund, in contrast, may
be an insurmountable hurdle. As shown by recent attempts to pass gun
control legislation, even when public opinion is staunchly in favor of
specific legislative actions, powerful lobbying interests can prevent
action. 162 Private car insurance companies will lose substantial business as
more people use AVs and rely on the Fund instead. Personal injury
plaintiff’s attorneys and insurance defense attorneys will also lose business
if legislation bars lawsuits. Lawyers and insurance companies have
159

See, e.g., Michael McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: Reps. Louie
Gohmert, Steve King Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Mar. 20, 2014, 7:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-steve-king_n_138397
3.html [http://perma.cc/ZPP6-E73]; O’Reilly: ‘ObamaCare Is Part of the Socialist Vision for America,’
FOXNEWS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://foxnewsinsider.com/2013/10/22/oreilly-obamacarepart-socialist-vision-america [http://perma.cc/742X-44NE].
160
Stephanie Condon, Poll: Most Americans Say Medicare Is Worth the Cost (Apr. 21, 2011,
8:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-americans-say-medicare-is-worth-the-cost/ [http://
perma.cc/9WNV-DR9P]; Jason Sattler, POLL: Clear Majority Want No Medicare, Social Security or
Education Cuts (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/poll-clear-majority-want-nomedicare-social-security-or-education-cuts/ [http://perma.cc/7P98-AQ22].
161
See Health Care that Works for Americans, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview [http://perma.cc/Q3KV-KSXA].
162
After the Newtown shootings, 71% of those polled supported a federal database tracking
gun sales, and 65% supported banning high-capacity ammunition magazines. Gary Langer, After
Newtown Shootings, Most Back Some Gun Controls, Poll Shows, ABC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/01/on-eve-of-newtown-recommendations-most-back-newgun-control-measures/ [http://perma.cc/66M3-4SXB]. But gun control measures failed in Congress.
Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate; Obama, in Defeat, Sees ‘Shameful Day,’
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1.
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substantial capital and will be willing to spend large amounts to try and
prevent creation of the Fund. 163 One potential solution would be for
NHTSA to contract out the day-to-day administration of the Fund to private
insurance companies to prevent the companies from going out of business
and ensure they get on board. 164 Most legislation has winners and losers, so
just because the Fund would harm some sectors does not necessarily mean
it cannot be created.
Legislators and the public may also not initially support the Fund
because of the view of government as slow, burdensome, and full of red
tape that will bog down claims. 165 This opinion of the government is not
necessarily supported by the numbers. The typical Medicare claim takes an
average of only 30 days to process, 166 but the typical initial application for
Social Security Disability Insurance can take 90 to 120 days to process. 167
Claims with private car insurance, can vary anywhere from a couple days
to 60 days to process. 168 Based on this evidence, sometimes the government
is faster and sometimes it is slower than private companies in processing
information. What is important for passing legislation, however, is public
opinion about how slowly the government operates, and therefore the
actual amount of time the Fund will take to process claims is irrelevant.
Proponents could build in statutorily required deadlines for processing
claims or attempt to emulate Medicare’s faster procedures to assure the

163
Lobbying by private insurers against legislation was recently seen in the fight against the
Affordable Care Act. Chris McGreal, Revealed: Millions Spent by Lobby Firms Fighting Obama Health
Reforms, GUARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/01/lobbyists-millionsobama-healthcare-reform [http://perma.cc/L4TC-T2KR] (health industry and interest groups spent $380
million); Rick Ungar, Busted! Health Insurers Secretly Spent Huge To Defeat Health Care Reform
While Pretending To Support Obamacare, FORBES (June 25, 2012, 8:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/06/25/busted-health-insurers-secretly-spent-huge-to-defeat
-health-care-reform-while-pretending-to-support-obamacare/ [http://perma.cc/HS8K-W4B9].
164
But contracting out may actually cost more, which could harm the Fund’s purpose of
keeping everyone’s costs lower than they are with private car insurance now. See Ron Nixon,
Government Pays More in Contracts, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A16.
165
Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Theory of Misgovernance, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1289, 1289 (1997); Emily
Ekins, Poll: Majority of Americans Say the Government Is Burdensome and Impedes Them,
REASON.COM (Dec. 12, 2013, 1:31PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/12/poll-majority-of-americanssay-the-gove2 [http://perma.cc/KS8T-9KTL] (“Americans think government, while necessary for
certain functions, is generally burdensome and impedes them more than helps them.”).
166
How Medicare Part A & B Claims Are Processed, CAL. HEALTH ADVOCS. (last updated
Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/billing/ab-processed.html [http://perma.cc/QK35A8B5].
167
Tim Moore, Applying for Disability - How Long Does It Take to Get Social Security
Disability or SSI Benefits?, SSDRC, http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestions1-46.html [http://perma.
cc/6J96-TL7E].
168
How Long Does it Take to Receive an Insurance Claim Check?, CARSDIRECT (June 25,
2013), http://www.carsdirect.com/car-insurance/how-long-does-it-take-to-receive-an-insurance-claimcheck [http://perma.cc/JXY4-R7LY].
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public that their claims will be processed as quickly as with private
insurance. In addition to concerns about how long claims will take to
process, there will likely also be apprehension about how long the initial
startup will take and what initial kinks there will be. Statutory deadlines
could also help assuage these anxieties.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this Note focuses on how to
structure insurance once AV use is widespread, and leaves to future
discussion the problems of the transition period from human-operated cars
to AVs. However, it is worth noting that one final problem with
implementing the Fund is the negative impact it will have on those who do
not switch to AV use. As more people use AVs and the Fund, fewer people
will be left buying private car insurance. The private companies will have
to substantially raise premiums on all remaining customers in order to
remain solvent and compensate for lost business. 169 As demand for private
insurance falls, the number of suppliers of insurance will also fall, and
those who still want private insurance will not benefit from multiple
companies competing for the best prices. 170 On the one hand, promoters of
universal AV use may want this because it will make continued use of the
more dangerous human-operated cars economically infeasible. But in the
short-term, fear of skyrocketing insurance prices for those who do not want
to use AVs could be another source of public disapproval of the Fund. One
option is for the government to provide short-term subsidies to those still
using human-operated cars during the transition period to help avoid public
outcry against the Fund. These subsidies should be short-term so that
drivers are still compelled economically to switch to the safer AVs within a
reasonable timeframe.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not profess to have all of the answers on how to
overcome the various barriers to creating the Fund. It does suggest,
however, that the federal government start planning for when AVs enter the
market. Although robot cars seem like something out of a futuristic movie,

169

Robert W. Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s
Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1381 (2012) (discussing how the insurance
companies will increase premiums for human-operated cars to compensate for losses in premiums for
AV riders).
170
It has been a long-running rule of economics that more competition drives down prices, and
this has been seen recently in the health insurance debates. See Geoffrey Cowley, New Signs that
Obamacare is Lowering Insurance Costs, MSNBC (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 7:15 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/new-signs-obamacare-lowering-insuranc [http://perma.cc/RJW9NELS] (explaining that the individual mandate creates a bigger market which forces private companies
to compete for customers by lowering costs).
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Google already has many AVs up and running, and major car companies
are looking to add AVs to their fleets within the next ten years.171
Legislators must start now to decide how best to distribute liability and
costs for accidents involving AVs. The government has an interest in
promoting the use of AVs, but for manufacturers to feel secure in releasing
these cars and for drivers to feel secure in using them, there will need to be
a system in place for addressing accidents. Creation of a no-fault system
coupled with a National Car Insurance Fund is at least one option for
legislators to consider moving forward.

171

See Knight, supra note 5; Lavrinc, supra note 5.
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